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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

nature

case

a

commercial real property owned by Respondents Michael R.
Properties, LLC (collectively "Hulsey").

against the
and SM Commercial

This foreclosure resulted in a one-day trial on the

deficiency liability which Washington Federal asserted against Hulsey because the value of the
commercial property Washington Federal foreclosed against was worth less than the balance due and
owing on the secured debt

B.

Relevant Procedural History
Washington Federal filed an action for the appointment of a receiver and to foreclose against

commercial rental units owned by Hulsey as a result of the non-payment of the loan when the loan
matured in 201
Washington Federal filed a summary judgment that was granted and a judgment and decree
of foreclosure as entered by the District Court. The day before the Sheriffs sale pursuant to the
foreclosure decree, Hulsey caused his limited liability company, which held title to the property, to
file a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy.
Washington Federal litigated multiple contested matters with Hulsey in the Bankruptcy Court
and prevailed on all of them resulting in the bankruptcy stay being lifted to allow the foreclosure to
continue.
Washington Federal rescheduled the foreclosure sale and acquired title to the property by
making a credit bid.
A one-day court trial was thereafter held on the value of Hulsey's commercial property to
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a

the MAI appraiser, Vicki Mundlin,

a market

property of

$780,000.00.
Hulsey presented no appraisal evidence from an appraiser whatsoever. The District Court
ruled that Hulsey's own personal testimony of the value of the property was not persuasive and did
not establish the market value of the property. Thus, his asserted value of the property (equal to
Washington Federal's debt) of$1,500,000.00 was rejected by the District Court, although the Court
thought that his opinion was closer to the mark than Washington Federal's market value. R. p. 1477.
Despite Hulsey's total lack of evidence, the District Court nevertheless ruled that the
appraisal evidence of the MAI appraiser was not persuasive to the Court either and thus, totally
rejected the appraiser's market value analysis because it was "subjective and not credible." R. p.
1477.
This appeal followed.

C.

Statement of Facts
The Purchase of the Commercial Condo Units
In early 2005, during the real estate boom before the Great Recession of 2008, Hulsey was

looking to invest in commercial real estate. It was during this time that he was on the national ski
patrol that he met Kerri Skoli who was a ski lift attendant supervisor at the Silver Mountain Resort
complex who had moved to Kellogg to help the owner of the resort, Jeld-Wen, build the resort then
under constrnction. Tr. p. 157, L. 5-13. She advised Hulsey that there were commercial condo units
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resort.

The Units had not

a

area

been constructed but nevertheless Hulsey wanted to purchase them as

uncompleted Units as a source of rental income~
Hulsey retained Jim Koon, a local commercial real estate broker who worked for Coldwell
Banker to advise him with regard to investing in real estate in Northern Idaho. Tr. p. 183, L. I 0.
Mr. Koon is a highly experienced commercial broker and property manager in the North Idaho area
and has sold and managed numerous parcels of commercial property in the Kellogg area.
Washington Federal Trial

No. 26; Tr. p. 85, L. 22.

Prior to closing on the purchase of the Units, Mr. Koon advised Hulsey not to purchase the
Units because he said that the Silver Mountain area was struggling financially and had always been
economically weak. Tr. p. 183,

20. Despite such advice, Hulsey proceeded to close on the

acquisition of the Units.
Hulsey purchased the Units for the total purchase price of $2,378,000.00 and financed
$1,350,000.00 of the purchase price through Washington Federal' s predecessor

interest bank. Tr.

p. 158, L. 20, 22. The commercial loan was made to Hulsey individually on August 31, 2005, and
the loan was secured against all of the Units.

The Problems with the Surrounding Ski Resort
After Hulsey purchased the Units and they were completed, he immediately realized that he
had made a terrible mistake in purchasing them. Tr. p. 179, L. 3-1
Hulsey began to experience severe problems with Jeld-Wen, the developer and owner of the
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L

The HOA Fees were Twice what was Represented and Did a Terrible Job
Maintaining the Common Areas:

"I realized it was a mistake when I received the first HOA bill from Jeld\\'en. Estimates, when I purchased the property, vvere going to be $2 a foot,
which would include insurance, maintenance, tax, property taxes, and
maintaining the property. The first bill I received was, like, $4 a foot. Didn't
include property taxes, and they were doing a terrible job of maintaining the
property and customer service. At that point I knew that it was a mistake."
Tr. p. 179, L. 6-14.
2.

After the Resort was Constructed it Shut Down Three to Four Days Out
of the Seven Day Recreational Week:

"Okay. Well, there's a plaza that separates the street from - and the
restaurant, which is - they' re Jeld-Wen's restaurant and the gondola building.
This plaza, it's-it was for entertainment. It was supposed to have been used
winter and summer for different festivities, bringing in a band, which I paid
for at one point. So we have two foot of ice there. And it was an ongoing
problem with Jeld-Wen doing anything. And it always will be as long as
they own it.

***

We were supposed to have directional signs for all the tenants in back
because you are back behind the - the restaurant. It's a little bit hidden. We
never got the directional signs.
The water park opened, and I talked to Jerry Anders about that, and he made
a statement-Jerry Anders was president of Silver Mountain and an officer in
the Jeld-Wen corporation. He made the statement he didn't want locals here
because he didn't want inbreds swimming in his pool. So it was closed to the
local inbred population. And I think recently they've opened it up to allow
local people to come into the into the water park.
Skiing, they closed the ski mountain down for three days a week. And in the fact it was really four days because they would al ways try to get out, open
it one day because of wind on the gondola. Everything that - mountain
biking, they stopped mountain biking. I mean, that was a big revenue
generator in the summer for us. Or for my tenants. So everything that we
tried to do, it ended up in a roadblock, and Jeld-Wen was saying, "We're not
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

The Value of the Condos in the Project Plummeted Because of the
Problems with the Resort:
"Yeah. Well, the first group of owners that bought condos, the vast majority
of them lost their condo, because a studio condo that sold for $135,000, JeldWen one day puts up signs in the elevators that they were 60,000 and they'd
finance them for 3 percent. They had condos in escrow at 135,000. And they
wouldn't give peoples' deposit back or lower the price. So yeah, I mean it
was disturbing for everybody. But people - the people who have the condos
there, it's a vacation spot, and the last thing they want to do is go up there
and be in conflict all the time with management. Although, I mean, there
were some meetings that were very, very hot. One meeting I talked a guy out
of not carrying a gun to it.

Q.

These were the HOA meetings?

A.
Yes. And, you know, we had meetings when they were going to close
down the mountain, and I told Jeff Colburn, who's still the manager there, I
said, "Do you realize what that's going to do to this development?" He said,
"Yes." I said, "You don't care?" He said, "We 're going to do it." And
that's the attitude they have." Tr. p. 181, L. 17-25 p. 182, L. 1-15.

4.

Jeld-Wen Never Re-Built Downtown Kellogg:
"Yeah. I purchased with - I purchased the property with hope and
anticipation that Jeld-Wen was going to be a strong leader in the community.
And at one point they had agreed to rebuild downto\:vn and to fund the
rebuilding of downtown Kellogg and to tum it into a Wallace. And yeah, it
didn't happen. So - I'm not saying what I did is the smartest thing in the
world. But I had faith in the community, the area, and Jeld-Wen." Tr. p.
192, L. 7-15.

5.

Jeld-Wen Prevented Hulsey's Tenants From Being a Success in the
Resort:
Q.
"Okay. So what kind of problems did Jeld-Wen create for your
tenants, then, in terms of the kind of uses they would make of their property?

A
One was outside beer sales at Mountain Cafe and counter. They had
outside tables, and Jeld-Wen tried to force them from not being able to serve
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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we were competition
it turns
their
cafe. And I had the pizza parlor and I had Mountain Cafe there. They did
not allow the gentleman who ran the day spa to perform his services inside
the condos. And that was a major part of his business was, after skiing,
people would come in - or bike riding and they'd wa.rit a massage. A_rid the
ladies would go up and give them a massage or whatever. That was just part
of his business. And Jeld-Wen stopped that.
Jeld-Went initially was going to advertise in the lobby for everybody. They
were going to put directional signs. They didn't do any of that. They
actually refused to - turned out they refused to advertise in the lobby or put
anybody on their flyer.
So you want me to keep going on the - there's other things. As we talk, I'll
continue to remember from eight, ten years ago." Tr. p. 208, L. 15-25 - p.
209, L. 1-17.

***

A.
Well, Mountain Cafe and the pizza parlor were mainstays. They were
there the whole time. I was able to get the salon going again. Jeld-Wen
made things really difficult. I mean, extremely difficult to do business there.
They would schedule a breakfast with Mountain Cafe that, say, "We have a
hundred businessmen coming in from Montana." This is a true story. "And
can you supply them with breakfast? Can you open up?" And they said
yeah.

They went and bought all the supplies. And nobody shows up. So Matt, one
of the owners, he goes across the way, and Jeld-Wen had a buffet set up.
They forgot to tell Matt that they were going to do it. And they were feeding
the businessmen in the conference center. So- and it was always something
similar. So it was very difficult maintaining tenants. I made rent concessions
to keep them there. As far as I mean, ifI charged them the HOA's and the
taxes, I would not have had one tenant there other than Jeld-Wen. Tr. p. 165,
L. 7-25.
It was acknowledged by everyone in the proceedings that the real estate taxes in Shoshone
County are some of the highest in the state. Tr. p. 87, L. 8.
Reaiizing what a mistake he had made, Huisey immediately tried to sell the Units as one
APPELLANT'S BR1EF
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as

success.

184,

12.

Compounding the difficulty

the Units was the real estate collapse

2008 which hit

resort areas such as the Silver Mountain Resort Complex hard.
As a result, the market for leasing the Units was "very difficult" and it was very hard for
Hulsey to keep paying tenants. Tr. p. 186, L. 22. Thus, several ofHulsey's key tenants could only
pay their base rent and could not pay the HOA fees or their real property taxes as required by their
leases:
Q. But I believe that you've testified that the way you would keep tenants is,
even though they're supposed to pay the HOA fees and they're supposed to pay
the real property taxes, you didn't press them on those points because it's better
to have a tenant in there paying what they can rather than to insist upon full
payment and then have them move out; correct?
A. I agree. That's correct. Tr.

186,

25

p. 187, L. 1-7.

Hulsey fully appreciated his financial predicament as a result of the terrible tourist and real
estate economy in the Kellogg area and low rents that were unable to service the debt on the
property. He thereafter transferred title to the Units to his wholly-owned limited liability company,
Commercial Properties, LLC, to "use the LLC as another layer to divert liability ... so I wanted
another layer of liability relief." Tr. p. 156, L. 14-19. Although he transferred title to his limited
liability company, he still remained liable on

loan because he was the original maker of the

promissory note payable to Washington Federal.
Pursuant to the express terms of the loan with Washington Federal, the entire amount due and
owing finally matured on September 5, 2012. Washington Federal granted him time to continue to
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31 20

to

a

the period of foreclosure. Hulsey stipulated to

entry of an Order Appointing Receiver on March

17, 2014, giving the Receiver foll authority to manage the Units until Washington Federal's
foreclosure was completed. R. Vol. 1, p. 259.

Hulsey's Market Value Report from Jim Koon
During the pendency of the judicial foreclosure, Hulsey commissioned Jim Koon to prepare a
fair market value analysis of the Units to give to Washington Federal. See Washington Federal Ex.
22, pp. 63-64; Tr. p. 187, L. 21. Mr. Koon analyzed the income and expenses for the Units based
upon his years of association with the property. The income and expenses were provided by Hulsey
to Mr. Koon. He concluded based upon his education, experience and analysis of the Units that their
combined fair market value as commercial property was $578,627.00. A true and accurate copy of
the full Koon fair market value analysis is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" for the convenience of the
Court. Tr. p. 190, L. 14. Hulsey testified he wrote in the Koon report:
A "The problems are Unit 7-B. Mountain Cafe struggles every month. All
tenants other than Jeld-Wen are now on a month-to-month.
A. "Even though the leases are - were triple net with tenants paying HOA fees
and property taxes, they cannot afford to pay. The spa salon has been vacant for
four months, and they're approximately six months behind in rent. My choice is
to force the tenants to pay all costs and lose them as tenants or attempt to keep
their units open and occupied."
Q. Now, of course, that's your language, isn't it?

A It is.

Q. Then read the next paragraph, please.
A "Silver }.fountain has become a part-time ski area and water park resort with
APPELLANT'S BR1EF

-8-

as

again,
is
of his opinion; correct?

A. I wrote this letter.
Q. You wrote the entire letter?

A. Yes.
Q. And then he signed it?

A. No. I wrote the Silver Mountain lease recap. I didn't write Jim Koon's letter
and have him sign it.

Q. Okay. So I understand financial figures that are reflected here and the
narrative statement at the bottom, you drafted that, and you provided it to Jim
Koon, and then he came with his broker's opinion of value.
A. That's true. Tr. p. 189, L. 10-25-p. 190, L. 1-21.
Hulsey admitted at trial that he authorized his attorney to tell Washington Federal during the
foreclosure that the property was worth nearly $700,000.00 less than the loan payoff as of December
31, 2013. His attorney wrote:

A. "Mr. Koon originally assisted in the sale of the property to Mr. Hulsey. Mr.
Koon has approximately 25 years of experience in this exact market, which
includes the negotiation of commercial leases and sales of commercial
leaseholds. Mr. Koon BPO shows actual annual income for the subject
properties at $126,856 and annual expenses excluding any maintenance
obligations of 62,707. The readily demonstratable market value of the property
is nearly 700,000 less than the payoff demand of December 31, 2013."

***

A. "We believe that the value of the collateral is no greater than the suggestion
by Mr. Koon's BPO. We would like you to consider the following: First, Mr.
Hulsey never missed a payment under this loan prior to Washington Federal's
acquisition of the loan. The only payment then missed, so to speak, was a recent
payment sent back by cover of your letter last week. Mr. Hulsey is not in that has not run from that matter and has kept proactively involved."
Tr. p. 195, L. 4-13; Tr. p. 195, L. 19-25 - p. 196, L. 1-2.
Given the substantial deficiency liability owed by Hulsey to Washington Federal,
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court.

R.

736 (Washington Federal

1).

Chapter 11 Bankruptcy: Market Value Determination

The Units were then scheduled for Sheriff's sale by the Shoshone County Sheriff's Office but
Hulsey had his limited liability company file a Chapter 11 bankruptcy with the Idaho Bankruptcy
Court on October 29, 2014, thereby preventing the Sheriffs sale and Washington Federal obtaining
its collateral. R. p. 824.
As a result of Hulsey filing bankruptcy, Washington Federal immediately filed its Motion
For Relief From Automatic Stay And Notice To Debtor on November 5, 2014, in order to obtain an
order of the Federal Bankruptcy Court allowing Washington Federal to reschedule the Sheriff's sale
in order to sell the Units at public auction and thereafter seek a deficiency judgment against Hulsey
for the difference between the fair market value as of the date of the Sheriff's sale and the balance
due and owing to Washington Federal. A true and accurate copy of the Motion For Relief From
Automatic Stay And Notice To Debtor is Washington Federal's Ex. 5. In paragraph XI of the
foregoing Motion, Washington Federal made three allegations: (1) that the fair market value of the
Units did not exceed $670,000.00; (2) that the loan balance owed to Washington Federal on August
18, 2014, was $1,487,517.62; and (3) that Hulsey had no equity whatsoever in the Units as a result of
those values.
Hulsey filed his Objection To Motion For Release Of Stay on November 14, 2014, and
alleged that the fair market value of the Units was $2,000,000.00. As a result of this contested issue,
the Honorable Terry L Myers scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the Motion To Lift Stay to
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was

Judge

Federal

at

presented its MAI appraisal showing that the Units had a value of $780,000.00. Hulsey's attorney at
the hearing conceded that Hulsey had no evidence to contest the ~.1AI appraised

oth~r thim two

failed offers that had been made for the property by individuals who wanted to acquire the entire
Silver Mountain Resort.
Judge Myers took the matter under advisement and the next day made his extensive oral
Findings Of Fact And Conclusions oflaw concluding that there was no equity in the Units because
the fair market value was largely uncontested by Hulsey because his two failed offers were not
credible evidence of value. Washington Federal Ex. 7, p. 12. Judge Myers then lifted the automatic
bankruptcy stay allowing Washington Federal to proceed with its judicial foreclosure which it
completed on March 5, 2015. Washington Federal made a credit bid of$765,000.00 at the Sheriffs
sale and received the property. See Washington Federal Ex. 16.

District Court Trial on Market Value After Bankruptcy Stay Lift
Thereafter, the Honorable Benjamin R. Simpson scheduled a trial to determine the market
value of the Units pursuant to Paragraph 10 of the foreclosure decree. Washington Federal Ex. 1.
Judge Simpson had no previous experience with this litigation because the handling judge had been
the Honorable Fred M. Gibler who had retired after the entry of the original Judgment And Decree
Of Foreclosure on August 18, 2014.
The only appraiser to testify at trial was Washington Federal's appraiser.

At trial,

Washington Federal presented the testimony of the Senior MAI appraiser, Vicki K. Mundlin, of the
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as

of Ms. Mundlin showing that

property was worth $578,627.00 as reflected on page 63

Hulsey presented no appraisal testimony whatsoever to contradict the evidence of value
produced by Washington Federal at trial. Hulsey had retained his own MAI appraiser to testify at
trial but didn't call him to testify, undoubtedly because the appraiser also concluded that Hulsey
would be liable for a deficiency as well. Instead, Hulsey testified that he personally believed the
Units were worth $1,500,000.00. Coincidentally, this $1,500,000.00 amount was equal to the
balance owed to Washington Federal on the promissory note after application of the appraised value
of the Units of$780,000.00, meaning Hulsey would not be liable fora deficiency. Mr. Hulsey based
his owner's opinion of value not on any appraisal analysis but rather on two old offers to purchase
the Units from individuals who tried and failed to purchase the entire Silver Mountain Resort in
2013 and 2014. Those offers never came to fruition because the proposed purchasers were never
able to purchase the resort.
After trial, the District Court issued its Memorandum Decision on November 13, 2015,
inexplicably ruling that neither party had proved the fair market value of the Units as of the date of
the Sheriffs sale of March 5, 2015. Thus, Washington Federal was not entitled to any deficiency
judgment against Hulsey. R p. 1477.
Thereafter, Washington Federal filed its Memorandum Of Costs And Attorneys' Fees for an
award of attorneys' fees and costs in pursuing the post-judgment collection actions and Motion To
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an

costs on
that neither party was a prevailing party in

post-judgment and decree foreclosure

proceedings. R. p* 1715
ISSUES ON APPEAL

A.

The District Court erred in ruling that market value had not been litigated before the
Bankruptcy Court and thus, collateral estoppel of res judicata did not apply.

B.

The District Court erred by not accepting Washington Federal's evidence of market value
that was uncontradicted by substantial competent evidence from Hulsey.

C.

The District Court erred in denying Washington Federal an award of attorneys' fees and
costs for its post-judgment collection efforts.

D.

The District Court erred in striking portions of Washington Federal's Roy Cuzner affidavit
relating to attorneys' fees.
STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL

The Court's review is limited "to a determination of whether the evidence supports the trial
court's findings of fact, and whether those findings support the conclusions oflaw." Sims v. Daker,
154 Idaho 975, 303 P.3d 1231, 1233 (2013). This Court applies a de novo standard to legal
questions and a clear error standard to findings of fact. Herrera v. Estay, 146 Idaho 674,679,201
P.3d 647, 652 (2009).
When reviewing a trial court's conclusions of law, "this Court is not bound by the legal
conclusions of the trial court, but may draw its own conclusions from the facts presented." Steuerer

v. Richards, 155 Idaho 280,311 P.3d 292,294 (2013).
However, this Court cannot set aside a trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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5

not

erroneous

not

on

l

51

at

ARGUMENT
A.

The District Court Erred in Ruling that Market Value had not been Litigated Before
the Bankruptcy Court and Thus, Collateral Estoppel of Res Judicata did not Apply.
The District Court erred in ruling that the Idaho Bankruptcy Court did not determine the

market value of the Units in the bankruptcy proceedings of SM Commercial Properties, LLC. As
previously noted, Hulsey had his single member limited liability company file a Chapter 11
bankruptcy the day before the day of the Court-ordered Sheriffs sale in order to stall Washington
Federal's foreclosure that he had already managed to delay since the loan matured back in 2012.
The District Court ruled on November 13, 2015, in its Memorandum Decision that "Judge
Myers did not determine the value of the subject property as asserted by Plaintiff" No further
analysis of the issue was made by the District Court. See R. p. 1467.
Under the Bankruptcy Act, however, the market value of the Units must be determined by the
Idaho Bankruptcy Court in order to adjudicate Washington Federal' s motion to lift the automatic
bankruptcy stay. All of this was ignored by the District Court in its Memorandum Decision.
The law on whether a foreclosure can be completed against real estate by a lifting of the
automatic stay or be further delayed in order to allow the real estate to be financial rehabilitated in a
Chapter 11 proceeding is very well-defined under federal law.
Judge Myers correctly ruled in his extensive findings and conclusion that the issue with
regard to a Section 362 stay lift is determined by whether there is any equity in the subject property
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to mean

I start with
motion
I find it to be the
most
issue
me. Its resolution will have a material impact on the adequate
protection motion and also on the Section 543 motion.

***

The structure of Section 362(d)(2) and the authorities that apply were recently
addressed by this Court in the matter of Ryerson, which can be found at 2014
Westlaw 642.876. Among other things, the Ryerson decision reflects that under
the case law, equity for the purposes of 362(d) will exist if there's value in the
subject property in excess of all claims that are secured by that property.
Additionally, the Ryerson case discusses 362(d)(2), the necessity for an effective
reorganization.

See Washington Federal's Ex. 7.
Judge Myers' review of the applicable rule is the law in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals as
stated by the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit in Sun Valley

Newspaper, Inc. v. Sun World Corp., 171 B.R. 71 (1994), wherein the Court stated the following:
Section 362(d)(2) provides that "on request of a party in interest and after notice
and hearing, the court shall grant relief from the stay ... with respect to a stay of
an act against property
if-(A) the debtor does not have an equity in such
property; and (B) such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization."
11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2).

***

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the property definition of
"equity" for purposes of§ 362(d)(2)(A) is the difference between the value of the
property and all the encumbrances upon it. Stewart v. Gurley, 745 F.2d 1194,
1196 (9th Cir. 1984). At the time the motion for relief from the stay was filed,
there is evidence that the fair market value of the property was $3,581,390 and
the liquidation value was $1,113,495. The indebtedness secured by liens against
the property was $5,289,114.54. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court correctly
concluded that there was no equity in the property. (Underlining added).
171 B.R. 75
This is the general rule in all bankruptcy jurisdictions:
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V.

'equity' in property is based on the u'"'""''-'
economic value to its owner." *869 Scripps GSB L
v. A Partners, LLC (In
re A Partners, LLC), 344 B.R. 114, 121 (Bankr.E.D.Ca.2006)(emphasis added).
Such conclusion is further supported by the definition of equity: "An ownership
interest" determined by "the a.'llount by which the value of or an interest in
property exceeds secured claims or liens." Black's Law Dictionary 560 (7th ed.
1999). 470 B.R. 864 (2012).
470 B.R. at P. 68
The requirement that the estimated value of the collateral be determined by the Bankruptcy
Court is also required by Idaho Bankruptcy Local Rule 4001.2(b) which states that a party requesting
relief from the automatic stay pursuant to§ 362(d) file a motion with the Court. The motion must:
( 1)

Identify the nature of the stay relief sought;

(2)
Provide the details of the underlying obligation or
liability upon which the motion is based;
(3)
Contain an itemization of amounts claimed to be
due upon the obligation;
(4)
When appropriate, state the estimated value of any
collateral for the obligation and the method used to obtain the valuation ...
(Underlining added).
***
Advisory Committee Notes:
This rule specifically requires certain information to be included in a motion for
relief from stay. A response must fairly meet the grounds of the motion. Both of
these requirements are enhanced by the requirement of specificity in
representation at the preliminary hearing. The Advisory Committee considered
and rejected requiring affidavits in regard to factual issues presented. (See, e.g.,
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7056). However, even though the current practice of allowing
representation of counsel is continued, in order to achieve the goal of productive
preliminary hearings, factual detail in such representation is mandated. Failure of
counsel to adhere to this standard may lead to sanction under the rule. See Fed.
R. Bankr. P. 9011 (Fed. R. Civ. P. 11). Notes to 2004 revisions. Under the
revised rule, unless cause is shown and prior court permission is obtained, the
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It therefore was mandatory for Judge Myers to determine the market value of the Units in this

litigation in order to determine the equity in the real estate.
Since the Washington Federal debt was approximately $1,500,000.00, Hulsey originally
contended that the first failed offer that he received in 2013 on the property established a market
value of$2,000,000.00. IfHulsey's value was correct then there would be $500,000.00 in equity in
the Units which, under certain circumstances in bankruptcy, would allow Hulsey to delay the
foreclosure for an extended time in order to allow him to implement a Chapter 11 workout plan.
Hulsey's proposed bankruptcy plan essentially asked the Bankruptcy Court to allow him to make
payments over time in order to eventually sell the property, even though he had no buyer at the time
he filed bankruptcy.
It was apparent to Washington Federal that the Chapter 11 proceedings instituted by Hulsey

was just another effort by him to delay the Sheriffs sale because of Hulsey's hope that he could
somehow sell the property in the future to avoid his deficiency liability. In light of this fact,
Washington Federal promptly filed its motion to have the stay lifted. As previously noted, in the
motion filed by Washington Federal, it represented to the Court that the value was no more than
$780,000.00 and because the debt was approximately $1,500,000.00, there was no equity in the
property.
In response, Hulsey objected to the stay lift motion by contending the Units were worth
$2,000,000.00 which moved the contested matter to a court hearing on the market value of the Units
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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uses a

process called a

IS

The parties are

required to specifically advise the court of the evidence to be presented.
The preliminary hearing

\Vas

held by the Bankruptcy Court on the then pending stay lift

motion and other motions, including specifically the value of the Units, on December 17, 2014.
After the hearing was completed, the Bankruptcy Court then adjourned and advised the parties that
the Court would issue its oral findings of fact and conclusion the next day on December 18, 2014.
At the hearing on December 18, 2014, the Court issued its detailed oral findings. The
Bankruptcy Court briefly reviewed the procedure the Court was required to use by federal law.
Under Section 362(e) the Court has held a preliminary hearing. Under that
section the Court shall order the stay continued in effect, pending conclusion of a
final hearing ifthere is a reasonable likelihood that the party opposing stay relief
will prevail at the conclusion of the final hearing.
Under our local rule counsel must make, at the preliminary hearing, specific
representations as to the witnesses to be called and their expected testimony and
thus, the evidence that will be presented at a final hearing were one to be ordered
held.

***
Here, the structure and the function of the local rule required representation of
specific witnesses, specific evidence that would be presented at a final hearing to
occur under the rules within 30 days. And without those representations there's
no justification in setting such a final evidentiary hearing.
The local rule is and has been for a long time a way for this Court to allow for the
development of a sufficient record to determine if a final hearing is required, or
conversely, if the issues can be determined one way or the other at the time of the
preliminary hearing.
So under both the local rule and using the language of362(e), I conclude that the
debtor has not shown, quote, "a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail at the
conclusion of the final hearing."
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10.

by a competing appraisal. In lieu of presenting any appraisal evidence regarding the market
of the Units, Hulsey instead argued that his tv10 failed offers of 2013 and 2014 that he had
received in the past showed that the Units were worth at least $1,500,000.00.
With this background, the Bankruptcy Court rejected Hulsey's arguments and issued the
following ruling:
I'm going to address first 362(d)(2), which I've outlined a moment ago. In regard
to the question of equity, the debt of Washington Federal is asserted to be
approximately 1.5 million dollars, and that estimate is not challenged by the
debtor. The creditor also specifically represents that it has a current MAI
appraisal establishing a value of the real property at $780,000.
The debtor initially argued that in August 2013 offered to purchase the property
at 2 million dollars, established a higher value. At hearing, debtor represented
that another newer offer to purchase the property, this time for 1.5 million dollars
had been made.

It appears from the representations at the preliminary hearing that both offers
were made by entities in which an individual, Dan Cox, is involved. The present
offer is contingent on the purchaser acquiring not just the property owned by the
debtor, but the Silver Mountain Ski area that it abuts. It's also contingent on
closing by January 31, 2015, some 45 days from now.
The debtor did not indicate under the local rule that Mr. Cox or others working
with the offeror would be testifying witnesses at a final hearing, and specifically
advised that it planned only on calling Hulsey as a witness.
The debtors' counsel also conceded that unless the Court accepted the suggestion
that the 1.5 million dollar contingent offer established value that it could not
otherwise contest the valuation figure offered by Washington Federal's appraiser.
On the representations required under the local rule, and given the requirements
of Section 362(d), (e), and (g), Washington Federal is found to have met its
burden of showing that there is no equity.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

19 -

the contingent nature of the offer, it's difficult for the Court to find that the
higher value is credible and should be applied for these purposes. (Underlining
added).
Parenthetically, Judge Myers observed that even if he accepted Hulsey's failed, contingent
offer of $1,500,000.00 from Dan Cox, there still would be no equity in the property:
Additionally, even if the Cox group proposal would be considered, the offer now
and the Washington Federal debt are both approximately 1.5 million. It's in the
vernacular, a push, and that's before considering other claims that may be
secured by the property, including HOA liens.
So in that regard, I find that the value is likely to be less than the amount of the
debt and ergo there is no equity. Washington Federal's Ex. 7, p. 12.

It is therefore clear from the transcript that Judge Myers accepted the appraisal evidence of
Washington Federal of$780,000.00 at a contested judicial proceeding. While it is true that Judge
Myers' final oral conclusion oflaw that there was no equity in the property did not explicitly state
that the $780,000.00 was a finding of fact, it is clear from the contested hearing that the $780,000.00
was a pivotal finding of fair market value because Hulsey's attorney stated that they had no evidence
to oppose it other than the two failed offers which were rejected by the Court. In other words, since
fair market value was the contested issue and it was essential under§ 362 for the Court to find the
value in order to find no equity, the $780,000.00 was and had to be the clear conclusion of the Court.
No other interpretation is possible.
As a result, the doctrine of issue preclusion applies. The doctrine of issue preclusion through
collateral estoppel is well established in Idaho law. In Kootani Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Lamar Corp.,
148 Idaho 116, 219 P.3d 440 (2009), the Idaho Supreme Court articulated the factors and

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

• 20 •

res

doctrine

the

Issue preclusion protects litigants from relitigating an identical issue with the same
party or its privy. (Citation omitted). Five factors are required to bar relitigation of
an issue determined in a prior proceeding: ( ! ) the pa.rty against whom the earlier
decision was asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided in
the present action; (2) the issue decided in the prior litigation was identical to the
issue presented in the present action; (3) the issue sought to be precluded was
actually decided in the prior litigation; (4) there was a final judgment on the merits in
the prior litigation; and (5) the party against whom the issue is asserted was a party or
in privity with the party to the litigation. Id. at 120 (citations omitted).
The doctrine of collateral estoppel as it relates to issue preclusion is uniquely applicable in
the current case. Hulsey in this matter had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the fair market value
issue in the Bankruptcy Court through counsel before a United States Bankruptcy Judge.
The issue decided in the prior contested matter is identical to the issue presented in the
action which is the fair market value of the real property involved in this litigation.
The issue sought to be precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation as shown by the
detailed and articulate decision of Judge Myers and the lifting of the federal bankruptcy stay to
complete the foreclosure.
The Order Granting Motion For Relief From Stay (Washington Federal' s Ex. 8) is a final
order and has not been appealed. Finally, the parties in this matter are the same parties or in privity
with the same parties in the current litigation since SM Commercial Properties, LLC is a whollyowned LLC by Hulsey and such entity is a party in the current litigation as the record title owner of
the Units. Tr. p. 156, L. 8.
As can be seen from the foregoing, there was no reason why the fair market value of this
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this case.

B,

The District Court Erred by Not Accepting Washington Federal's Evidence of Market
Value which was Uncontradicted by Substantial Competent Evidence from Hulsey.
The trial court should have to accept the virtually uncontradicted evidence submitted by

Washington Federal regarding the market value of the Units submitted by its MAI appraiser at trial.
State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 288,295,603,610,955 P.2d (Ct. App. 1997); Swanson v. State, 114 Idaho

607,609, 759 P.2d. 898,900 (1988).
Hulsey's only evidence was his own testimony of value of $1,500,000.00 which was not
based upon any analysis whatsoever.
As previously noted, the Supreme Court will set aside a trial court's findings if they are
clearly erroneous. Lovitt v. Robideaux, 139 Idaho 322, 78 P.3d 389 (2003). To decide whether
findings of fact are clearly erroneous the Supreme Court must determine whether the findings are
supported by substantial competent evidence. Id. at 325. Evidence is substantial and competent if a
reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely on it. Id. This same concept has also been expressed
that findings are clearly erroneous when they bear no rational relationship to the supporting
evidentiary data. See e.g., US v. Kaplan, 277 F.2d 405 (5th Cir. 1960).

Evidence of Qualifications of Washington Federal 's Appraiser
Vicki K. Mundlin, MAI, Senior Managing Director with an Idaho State License as a Certified
General Real Estate Appraiser, was retained by Washington Federal to appraise the Units over a
course of years. As a result, Ms. Mundlin had appraised the Units at least four (4) times in the past,
including the last appraisal with an effective date of March 5, 2015, being the date which the
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was

at

p.

Falls, Idaho

estate

works in an office with thirteen ( 13) appraisers including five (5) senior managing directors of which
she is one of the senior managers. Tr.

39, L. 14-18.

She became an appraiser in 1992 and received the highest appraisal designation of MAI from
the Appraisal Institute in the year 2000. Tr. 41, L. 14-22. She also has served as President of the
Appraisal Institute and her sub-specialty is the appraising of master-planned communities involving
mixed uses of commercial and residential projects such as the one involved in the current litigation.
She has appraised properties in Schweitzer Mountain in Sandpoint, Post Falls, and Coeur d'Alene
and other areas. Tr. p. 41, L. 25

p. 42, L.7.

As part of her background, she had inspected the Units on multiple occasions and in fact had
inspected the project on the day of the trial. Tr. p. 42, L. 13-22. As a result, Ms. Mundlin has
extensive experience in appraising real property in northern Idaho, including the Kellogg market.
As a result of her involvement with the Units, she was aware that the Units had been
marketed for sale for a number of years by Hulsey but had never sold. She testified:
Well, the subject of this that I was involved in are nine commercial condos, just
over 8,300 square feet total. And they're on the ground floor of the residential
condominiums. You know, the developer had listed the units, over the years
since he'd acquired them, at various prices and didn't have any luck selling them.
So he ended up operating them basically as a rental property, multi-tenant rental
property, which, you know, we saw throughout the larger market as well. We
saw in Coeur d'Alene and Post Falls, these projects that, you know, came to
completion right about the time the recession hit. They lost the ability to sell the
units. And so they ended up operating them as income-producing properties.
So as an income-producing property, we as appraisers rely on the income
approach, which is basically where we look at, you know, the rents less vacancy
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By

of her experience with the Units and her professional experience in northern Idaho,

Ms. Mundlin, as a senior appraiser, is one of the most qualified appraisers in Idaho. Ms. Mundlin's
formal qualifications are set forth in detail in the addenda to her narrative appraisal appearing on
page 103 of Plaintiffs Ex. 22 being her narrative appraisal report. R p. 103.

Vicki Mundlin's Narrative Appraisal
Vicki Mundlin's extensive and detailed 104 page analysis of the Units was admitted into
evidence as Plaintiffs Ex. 22. This appraisal is the only evidence of market value in the trial record
from an Idaho licensed appraiser.
This appraisal is broken into specific sections to provide a logical and analytical approach to
the determination of the fair market value of the Units as of the date of foreclosure of March 5, 2015.
The appraisal is basically divided into five major sections. Beginning on page 6 of her appraisal, she
recites the results of her analysis of the region and the market area in which the property is located.
She then gives a detailed explanation of the particular condo units constituting the Units as well as
measurements, age, tax assessment information and related data necessary in order to analyze the
property.
The next major section of the appraisal discusses what is the highest and best use of the
property and the major approaches that are used to analyze the value of property. These approaches
are the cost approach, income capitalization approach, and sales comparison approach as described
by her on page 27 of her appraisal. She concluded that the income capitalization approach was the
best form of analysis since the property is an income producing property and that is the way that
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appraisal report

on

the income and sales comparison approaches are reconciled for a final

determination of value as of March 5, 2015. As a result of her analysis, she appraised the property
as having a fair market value on March 5, 2015, of $780,000.00 if the property were sold with the
existing leases in place at the property. If the property were sold with no leases in place then the
property would sell for $765,000.00.
Her final opinion of value was above that of Hulsey' s real estate broker and advisor, Jim
Koon, who concluded that value was $578,627.00, as shown in his opinion of value set forth in
pages 63 and 64 of Ms. Mundlin's appraisaL
In arriving at the accurate fair market value of the property, Ms. Mundlin analyzed in detail
the pertinent factors necessary to arrive at a fair market value and set forth the basis of her opinion as
to the accuracy of the factors that she relied upon. Those three factors which are relevant to this
appeal are analyzed in detail below from her appraisal and her testimony at trial.
1.

Vacancy Rate for the Units.

In arriving at the vacancy factor used by investors interested in purchasing income-producing
property, it is necessary to know what type of vacancies one could expect over a period of time if
one was to purchase the Units for their income producing potential.

As everyone at trial

acknowledged, the Kellogg area has been struck particularly hard by the recession as confirmed by
the failure of Hulsey to sell his property despite over a decade of attempts to do so. The weakness in
commercial rentals at this struggling resort well illustrated the vacancy risk with regard to this type
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on page

of Washington

22

As discussed in the Market Analysis, vacancy projections in Kellogg range from
20% on the north side ofl-90, where Dave Smith Motors is a big player, to 50%60% in the older, uptown neighborhood. The physical vacancy of overall
commercial space currently available within the Morning Star Village is 35%
when including Unit 8, and 64% when including the large commercial shell
available on the ground floor in Building C. The vacancy within the subject
suites along is 24%. The subject space includes the desirable end cap space
utilized as the hotel lobby and sales window for ski passes. It is unlikely this
space will go vacant, as it is critical to the ski resort's operation. The remaining
suites, except for the small office, all have desirable locations and storefronts that
open into the village patios and walkways, providing superior access to
pedestrian traffic.
The above analysis of potential gross rents for the leased fee analysis is
$14.45/sf, or 96% of the potential gross rents on a Fee Simple basis. This is the
result of reduced lease rates for the ski operation, but increased rents for the local
tenants. Reconciling the above factors, I have concluded a mid-range vacancy
rate of25% in the Fee Simple analysis, and slightly lower vacancy rate of 22%
for the Leased Fee analysis, which already reflects some economic rent loss as a
result of the below-market rents for the local tenants.
Accordingly, her conclusion is imminently reasonable and appropriate given the fact that two
of the tenants out of the nine Hulsey Units can't pay the full monthly rental required by their leases.
Tr.p.189,L.15-21.
Significantly, Ms. Mundlin confirmed that after the March 5, 2015 appraisal date of her
appraisal, the most important unit leased by the Jeld-Wen resort (Unit 1) had its rent reduced from
$4,000.00 a month to $2,000.00 a month. This would have further reduced the fair market value of
the Units by $261,000.00. Tr. p. 115, L. 18-p. 116, L. 9. This ofcourse occurred after the March
5, 20 I 5 appraisal date but confirmed the type of concessions which had to be made in order to keep
tenants in the building in the troubled real estate market then existing in Kellogg.
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net

an interest

rate factor is determined based upon the evaluated "'"'"'"V'"'"" risk of the property. Thus, a property
has lm,y risk to a purchasing investor v1ill have a low cap rate because the investor is willing to
accept a lower rate of return on his or her invested money because of the perceived security and
stability of the rent flow.
Conversely, the capitalization rate is higher for those properties where the risk factor is
greater and thus, the investor expects a higher rate of return on his or her invested capital because of
the perceived economic insecurity surrounding the properties. A low cap rate will increase the value
of the property in the analysis and a high cap rate will reduce the value of the property because of the
increased perceived risk factor.
The cap rate was carefully analyzed by Ms. Mundlin in both her narrative appraisal as well as
in her testimony at trial as it related to the leased fee and fee simple values. With regard to the
leased fee valuation approach, she testified:
Q. Now, can you just right here explain the capitalization rate because
sometimes it's a concept that can elude us sometimes in terms of understanding
this.
A. Sure. So, for example, on the next - let's see. Looking in this report - let's
see, on page 34 we have some capitalization rates from multi-tenant sales that
have occurred in the local market. And those sales basically - so the cap rate is
generated by - we confirm the sale price, and then we confirm the buyer's
projection of net operating income for the property. And we take the net
operating income, divide it by the sale price, and it comes up with the cap rate,
which is a percentage rate. And in this example those cap rates on the local sales
were anywhere from 6.1 percent up to 8.75.
Now, that 6.1 percent, that was a NAPA Auto Parts store in the city of Post Falls.
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almost
at night You're only going to get a 6.1 percent return on
you're not going to lose sleep over it either.
At the high side of the range, we had one at 8. 75 percent interest. And that was a
little mixed use- it was a tvvo-tenant office building on 1t\nton, an older building.
It had a little bit of deferred maintenance. One of the tenants - the investor was
in danger of losing one of the tenants there. The lease was getting ready to
expire, and they weren't sure they were going to renew; so there was some risk.
You know, and you're going to lose a little bit of sleep on that one; so your return
on your investment on that one was - they agreed to an 8.75 percent cap rate.
That's the way it was purchased on. Meaning that, when he paid the $1,585,000
for it, his unleveraged rate was 8.75 percent. He expected to get $138,000 off of
his investment that year or, you know, in the future a year.
So then the question is, well so none of these sales are from Kellogg. We
couldn't find any comparable multi-tenant retail office buildings that had sold in
Kellogg to generate a cap rate. So I went about talking to whoever would talk to
me and interviewed a couple of local successful retail brokers from Coeur
d'Alene and Sandpoint. And their initial thought was on my project as well, you
know, in a resort community you probably ought to have a cap rate closer to 9
percent just to reflect the risk of investing in that market. And I talked to them a
little bit, and I said, "Well you know, this property I think it's bottomed out. It's
been bumping along at the bottom for the last four years. You know, 63- to
70,000 a year in income. You know, I don't think an investor would think that
they could do any worse than how it's performed at this point. I mean, hopefully
there will be some upside potential in the future of the resort to get it back
together sort of thing." And so we talked about it, and I managed to get
comfortable with an 8.25 percent cap rate on the property. Tr. p. 52, L. 13 - p.
55, L. 1
Her testimony at trial with regard to the fee simple approach was similar:
A. Well, when a property is foreclosed upon, the lender does have the ability to
break the leases and go ahead and reassign them at market. So I was asked for a
fee simple value as though the leases weren't in place. And that's where you
adjust-you just go ahead and adjust the rents to market anywhere from - I think
I ended up from $8 up to $25 a square foot for this basis.

Q. Now does that appear on a particular page, maybe starting at 37 to 38?
A. Let's see. Yes. The actual - so it's basically the same as the preceding one
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Q. Okay.
A. And so you'll see I move the Silver Mountain end cap space. That's, you
know, the - that includes the hotel lobby, there's the bike storage, there's a gift
shop right in there. I adjusted that rent downward io $25 a square foot. I
adjusted the ski shop rent down to $12 a square foot. And I adjusted the two
restaurant leases up to what I thought was a market rent of $12 a square foot.
Once again we add the reimbursements. I used a little bit higher 25 percent
vacancy on here because I had adjusted those local restaurants up. But, anyway,
I came out with a similar effective gross income of 143,000 and the expenses are
essentially the same. The net operating income was just a little bit less at
$62,933 in this analysis. And using the same cap rate of 8.25, I come up with a
value of 765. Tr. p. 56, L. 5 -p. 57, L. 10.

The capitalization rate determined by Ms. Mundlin is very reasonable given the fact that Jim
Koon, while working for Hulsey on his valuation, determined that the cap rate for the Units should
be 11 %, which had the effect of lowering the value of the property because of the high risk
associated with the property. See page 63 of the Mundlin appraisal. It should be noted that Hulsey
specifically approved of Jim Koon's opinion of value and indeed, wrote the entire second page of the
Koon analysis himself. Tr. p. 187, L. 21; Tr. p. 190, L. 14.
Accordingly, Ms. Mundlin provided an excellent justification of the basis for her
capitalization rate to determine the value of the Units as of March 5, 2015.

3.

Expenses: Management and Property Taxes.

Since the valuation of income-producing property is dependent upon the net profit generated
by the Units, the management expense for the property as well as the real property taxes assessed by
the local county treasurer are important components of the expenses ofincome-producing property.
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Management Expense

authorizing payment

expenses, a.rid ensuring that the property was protected during the

process of foreclosure and the rents not diverted by Hulsey. The Receiver was paid by the hour and
his fees constituted 13.14% of the overall Units' rental income.
The parties also agreed that Jim Koon, as Mr. Hulsey's real estate broker and advisor, would
provide the onsite management for the property because the Receiver has his office in the State of
Washington. Mr. Koon agreed for the limited services he provided as the onsite person for the
Receiver that he would charge $850.00 per month which amounts to 7.78% of the Units' overall
rental income. Accordingly, the total management fee for the property expressed as a percentage of
the rent was 20.92%.
Despite the high actual management costs for the Units, Vicki Mundlin approached the
management fee issue from what the market buyer would view as a reasonable management fee for
income producing in an area such as Kellogg, Idaho. Ms. Mundlin interviewed a local real estate
agent involved in managing property as well as interviewed the Receiver who regularly manages real
property and is a licensed real estate broker as well. The results of her analysis revealed that a total
10% management fee was reasonable under the circumstances, especially

an economically

struggling area such as Kellogg. She testified:
Right. Actually- so when I did this appraisal back in 2012, I actually concluded
a management fee of 4 percent, and then I realized that, you know, when Mr.
Rinning received control ofit, he was actually paying Mr. Koon, Jim Koon, who
is a Realtor over in Coeur d'Alene, he was paying 850 a month, which worked
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I want to

norms a management contract be?"
it
10 percent
And Mr. Rinning also indicated that he thought the appropriate fee was closer to
10 percent. And the reality is that, you know, when you're going to show the
units or do anything, you're going to have to drive over from Coeur d'Alene or
somev1here. It's going to take - it's going to be more time consuming to manage
a property in a resort community. Tr. p. 83, L. 7 - p. 84, L. 1.

Real Estate Taxes
Real estate taxes are another important component of the property expenses which impacts
net rental income.
Shoshone County is well known for having some of the highest real estate taxes in the State
ofldaho. Tr. p. 87, L. 8.
During Hulsey' s period of ownership including through the day that he lost ownership at
foreclosure sale on March 5, 2015, Hulsey never protested or appealed the property taxes on the
Units. Accordingly, as of March 5, 2015, the real estate taxes were at their same level they had
historically been at during Hulsey's tenure of ownership. Nevertheless, Ms. Mundlin contacted the
Shoshone County Assessor and analyzed what might be happening with the County tax assessments
in the future, just as a prudent potential buyer would do if analyzing the financial prospects of the
Units in a possible purchase transaction. She learned the following:
Well, it doesn't address excessive assessments, so to speak, but we need to, you
know, analyze appropriate expenses. And in this case I did speak with Mr.
White, who is the Shoshone County assessor. And I think it says probably on the
following page here that as of March of 2015 - you know, commercial
condominiums kind of have a double problem. They're legally described as
condominiums, individual units that are smaller, you know, from 240 square feet
up to 1,393 square feet. 1,558, I guess, is the largest one. So it's the assessor's
job to assess them as they are legally described, which means you could
potentially sell them off as an individual unit. Tr. p. 88,
16 - p. 89, L. 4.
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***

When I talked with Mr. White, he indicated that
commercial appraiser was
going to be starting the reassessment cycle on Commercial Properties the first
half of 2015 and that there may be some room for some adjustment, but they
couldn't tell me at that point if there was going to be any adjustment. So as an
appraiser I need to report the actual expenses.
The appeal has not- an appeal has not been done on the subject property. I don't
know what success there would be in an appeal at this point. So my opportunity
to adjust -I went ahead and made the decision to use the actual taxes, and then I
can adjust from my perception of risk and my conclusion of a cap rate on the
property. Okay? So as you recall, I used an 8.25 percent cap rate, which was
certainly less than the 9 percent the other two commercial brokers I interviewed
thought might be appropriate for a recreational property in Kellogg. But part of
my reasoning of going to the lower cap rate was in my opinion an appeal of this
property or even maybe just an outright downward movement on the assessed
value could occur with this upcoming reevaluation period. Tr. p. 89, L. 5 p. 90,
L. 8.

***

You need to keep in mind I'm valuing the nine units together at the $780,000.
Even in this discussion I recognize that in fact, I said basically even - the
assessor's charged with valuing them as individual units. He can't help the fact
that, because of the market, Mr. Hulsey's not been able to sell them individually,
that he's operating them as a multi-tenant property.
Q. But if they're sold as nine units for $780,000 in an arm's length transaction,
the assessor will be required to apportion proratably the new purchase price
versus the unit size. He's not just going to ignore it, is he?
A You know, assessors and appraisers don't always agree.

Q. Suffice to say you've made no provision in your expense calculation for any
prospective reduction in taxes.
A I made the provision in the income capitalization rate selection.

Q. In the - so you raised the cap rate A. I lowered the cap rate.
Q. You lowered the cap rate?
A -- to reflect upside potential of getting some reduction in property taxes. Tr.
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Opportunities: If the resort sells to another operator; there will likely be renewed
energy and marketing efforts that will increase opportunities for the owner of the
subject units. In addition, the com1nercial condominiums are currently being reassessed in 2015, as part of the five-year assessment cycle for Shoshone County.
The County Assessor indicated a willingness to look at actual income and
expenses for the subject property if the upcoming reassessment results in
continued higher-than-appropriate market value estimates for the individual
condominiums. In my opinion, the current individual assessments might
conservatively be reduced by 25% or more through either the upcoming
reassessment cycle or an appeal based on actual rents and expenses being
generated by the subject units. A 25% reduction in value would reduce the
market value to $1,025,781, or $122.60/sffor the 8,367 sfin the subject property.
Using the current levy rate, the resulting taxes would be $2.81/sf, or nearly $1/sf
less than the current tax liability of $3.83/sf. The addition of $1/sfto the NOI
projections in both the Leased Fee and Fee Simple analyses increases the
projected NOI available to the owner by $8,367, effectively increasing the
implied overall capitalization rate in both scenarios to 9.3% as discussed on the
following page. Washington Federal's Ex. 22, p. 35.
As is illustrated above, the appraisal by Ms. Mundlin was thorough and detailed and
constitutes substantial and competent evidence of the value of the property. Thus, the District Court
committed clear error by rejecting it.

Dan Cox's Two Offers
The District Court in its Memorandum Decision had ruled that the two Dan Cox offers were
not persuasive because the District Court rejected Hulsey's opinion of value.
Also, as previously emphasized, Hulsey presented no appraisal evidence at trial, nor did he
provide the District Court with any reasoned analysis of the market value of the Units whatsoever.
Instead, Hulsey's sole evidence consisted of two failed offers from the same individual and
acquaintance, Dan Cox, that were both contingent upon Mr. Cox purchasing the entire neighboring
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Offers are not
owner. Offers to purchase are generally inadmissible pursuant to this Court's ruling

Oregon-

Washington R. & Nav. Co. vs. Campbell, wherein the Court aI'..nounced the folhwing rule:
While some courts have admitted as tending to show market value of property
bona fide offers to purchase, we think that the great weight of authority, as well
as of reason, is against the admissibility of such testimony. 34 Idaho 601, 602,
202 p. 1065 (1921).
Other Courts also follow the Idaho rule because market value should be determined based
upon closed transactions rather than failed, contingent offers that never resulted in a sale.
Such offers are not reliable evidence of value because actual closed sales ofreal estate show
true transaction values whereas sales that never occur are speculative proposals. Moreover, offers
are subject to manipulation by the parties because anyone can make an offer at any price that bears
no reasonable relationship to the true value of the property.
In the current litigation, Hulsey's acquaintance, Dan Cox, was the principal of the two
entities that made the offers relied upon by Hulsey denoted as Hulsey' s Exhibits U and V were both
contingent upon the buyer purchasing a multi-million dollar neighboring resort as well as the Units.
No earnest money was ever paid as stated in the two offers and no proof was ever submitted that he
could pay for the properties. Tr. p. 198, L. 1.
Hulsey's first offer from Mr. Cox (Hulsey's Ex. U) was dated back on August 13, 2013, and
proposed to purchase the Units for $2,000,000.00. Hulsey's exhibit was not signed by the buyer
entity. Tr. p. 198,

1

This sale never occurred because the buyer could never purchase the

resort.
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a

to

same

Washington Federal,

making it look like

was no deficiency liability on Hulsey's part.

Although Hulsey's LLC, SM Commercial Properties, LLC, had no Bm1Ir.ruptcy Court permission to
accept the offer. Hulsey nevertheless did accept the offer anyway but this offer also failed to close
because Dan Cox was again unable to purchase the resort.
Dan Cox never opened escrow on the two prior failed offers and nothing more occurred with
regard to them other than the offers being made to Hulsey.
In the Chapter 11 bankruptcy of Hulsey' s limited liability company, Hulsey attempted to use
the two failed offers as evidence of the fair market value of the Units, but the Honorable Terry
Myers, Bankruptcy Judge, categorically rejected the contingent offers and ruled that the two failed
were not evidence of value because they were far too speculative to support a value opinion:
Given the inherent ambiguities, the questions and the problems with the Cox
group offer, including questions about whether or not a purchase of the entire
resort in 45 days is feasible, likely, or otherwise that there's a factor that affects
the contingent nature of the offer, it's difficult for the court to find that the higher
value [$1,500,000.00] is credible and should be applied for these purposes.
Washington Federal's Ex. 22, p. 12.
Even more prejudicial to Washington Federal, the District Court then used these two offers
against Washington Federal in the decision by implying that Washington Federal had deliberately
failed to tell Vicki Mundlin, MAI, as the independent appraiser, about the two failed offers. The
Court stated, "The Court finds Plaintiffs failure to disclose the known contingent offers to Ms.

Mundlinpotentially skewed Ms. Mundlin's appraisal value of the subject property." See R. Vol. 6,
p. 1474. (Emphasis added).
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was

presence
market value at

Tr. p. 11

two contingent

not

aware

ofthe

L. 4.

Nothing could have been more prejudicial to Washington Federal's case tha...11 for the District
Court to reject the MAI appraiser's detailed appraisal because she did not rely upon failed sales
offers as evidence of value which as a matter oflaw are not even evidence of value in Idaho.
Nevertheless, Vicki Mundlin was aware of the two failed offers and they made no difference
to her opinion of value. Appraisers of course use comparable sales to establish value, not failed,
highly speculative offers from acquaintances of the property owner contingent on purchasing a
multi-million dollar resort complex in forty-five (45) days. It therefore is clear error for the District
Court to have concluded that Washington Federal somehow should be punished for not disclosing
two failed, inadmissible offers when in fact they were disclosed prior to trial.

Six Undisclosed Trial Exhibits: DD Through II
Hulsey produced six exhibits that had not been disclosed prior to trial in violation of the
Court's pretrial disclosure order. These exhibits were never admitted into evidence, Tr. p. 101, L.
24, but nevertheless were used at trial for cross-examination of Vicki Mundlin. The Court stated that
the exhibits were "not going to be assumed to be correct." Tr. p. 110, L. 20-21. Each one of these
exhibits altered the one financial assumption in the financial analysis used in the appraisal by Vicki
Mundlin. For example, one exhibit altered the capitalization rate and another exhibit altered the
vacancy rate from that which had been determined by Ms. Mundlin from the property analysis she
performed. As a result, the various values of the property changed as one would expect from the
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finding that

was

and

appraisal without any

basis or rationale other than the Court's ruling that the appraisal was not credible. R. p. 1477.
This is a complete reversal

what the Court had ruled at trial where he said they would not be

assumed correct.
Other Grounds Relied Upon by District Court

The District Court held that Mr. Hulsey had many years of experience in the valuation of
commercial real estate. R. p. 14 71. At no time did Hulsey say that he had extensive experience in
the valuation of commercial real estate. Tr. pp. 150-155.
As previously noted, the District Court also said that Vicki Mundlin was unaware of the two
failed offers and that Washington Federal should have disclosed them to her even though she
testified at trial that the two offers were known to her before trial and made no difference to her
opinion of value.
The District Court also said that she did not take in to account the assemblage theory which
meant that if the entire ski resort sold and was assembled with the Hulsey's Units that the value
might be increased. Ms. Mundlin, however, clearly testified such an assemblage in this case was not
reasonable. Tr. p. 81, L. 3. In fact, her research showed the resort was auctioned with no bidder.

p.81,L.17.
The District Court held that she did not have a realistic view of the rents but the evidence at
trial showed that some of the tenants couldn't even pay the existing rent and in any event, the key
in the property being Unit Number 1 had its rent cut in half, further confirming the weakness in
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1

18.

Denying

an

its Post-Judgment Collection Efforts
The District Court ruled that Washington Federal was not

to an award of costs and

attorneys' fees after the entry of the foreclosure judgment because the Court ruled that Washington
Federal was not a prevailing party in the post-judgment proceedings. R. p. 1722.
Washington Federal's Promissory Note and Deed of Trust exclusively provide for an award
of attorneys' fees to Washington Federal for any effort to enforce its indebtedness and to foreclose,
including any legal services rendered with regard to a bankruptcy that might be filed during such
process. See Washington Federal's Trial Ex. 28 and Defendant's Trial Ex. A Moreover, the parties'
Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure (Order of Sale) specifically reserved in Section 10 the right to
attorneys' fees post-judgment. Washington Federal's Ex. I
Further, Washington Federal's entitlement to an award of attorneys' fees after the entry of
judgment is guaranteed by Idaho Code§ 1 120(5).
In any event, the foregoing Promissory Note and Deed of Trust make it clear that
Washington Federal is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs regardless of whether it is a
prevailing party. The trial Court's ruling in stating that the prevailing party requirement is the test
for the award of attorneys' fees in the current situation plus the trial Court's ruling that Washington
Federal was in any event not a prevailing party is in error.
The parties have by contract limited the availability of an award of attorneys' costs in
litigation between the parties to only be in favor of Plaintiff Washington Federal and not for
Hulsey. Idaho Code §12-120(3) as well as Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure are not
applicable to the current request of Hulsey for an award of attorneys' fees and costs because the
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210 P.3d 552 (2009),

the
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The Zenners later requested attorney fees and costs pursuant to Paragraph 20 of
the contract. Paragraph 20 provided: "Attorney's fees. Should any kind of
proceeding including litigation or arbitration be necessary to enforce t.1-ie
provisions of this agreement the prevailing party shall be entitled to have it's
[sic] attorney's fees and costs paid by the other party."

***
"The application of [a] procedural rule is a question oflaw on which we exercise
free review." Blaser v. Cameron, 116 Idaho 453, 455, 776 P.2d 462, 464
(Ct.App.1989). Under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(I), a "court may award reasonable attorney
fees ... when provided for by ... contract." (Emphasis added). I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)
sets forth the factors the court must consider to determine what amount is
reasonable. However, I.R.C.P. 54(e) is only applicable if the reasonableness
criteria found in LR.C.P. 54(e)(3) is not inconsistent with the attorney fees
provision in the contract. I.R.C.P. 54(e)(8). LR.C.P. 54(e)(8) states: "The
provisions of this Rule 54( e) relating to attorney fees shall be applicable ... to any
claim for attorney fees made pursuant ... to any contract, to the extent that the
application of this Rule 54(e) to such a claim for attorney fees would not be
inconsistent with such other contract"

***

The contract provision does not contemplate the court's involvement m
determining whether the fee is reasonable.
147 Idaho at P.446, 451
In Post v. Murphy, 125 Idaho 47, 873 P.2d 118 (1994), the Idaho Supreme Court ruled
that provisions of the parties' contract allowed for an award of attorneys' fees even when the
party was not a prevailing party. The contract provision read:
In the event that the Grantors shall employ legal
counsel in connection with or to enforce these
covenants and restrictions, then the persons with
respect to which such employment occurs shall pay
all costs incurred, including reasonable attorneys'
fees.
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The Court held that since the contractual provision did not require
lessor
be the prevailing party order to recover fees, such would not be a requirement,
as long as the only requirement specifically imposed by the provision-that the
lessor found it necessary to bring suit-was satisfied. Id., at 565, 836 P .2d at 511.
"[W]here there is a valid contract between the parties which contains a provision
for an award of attorney fees and costs, the terms of that contractual provision
establish a right to an award of attorneys fees and costs." Id. at 568-69, 836 P.2d
at 514-15. Farm Credit controls the costs and fees recovery of appellants in this
case. The only requirement in paragraph 24 of the Restrictions is that a granter
employ legal counsel in connection with the Restrictions. It is beyond question
that this requirement was met since Elmar Grabher was both an original granter
and a defendant employing counsel in connection with the Restrictions. Contrary
to plaintiffs' suggestion, it does not change the applicability of Farm Credit that
in Farm Credit there was no prevailing party, while here plaintiffs prevailed on
the legal issues. Under Farm Credit, unless the contractual attorney fees
provision specifically requires such, no "prevailing party" requirement will be
imposed on a contractual right to recover fees.
125 Idaho at 120; See also Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Wissel, 122 Idaho
565,836 P.2d 511 (1992).
In the current litigation, Hulsey and Plaintiff Washington Federal agreed by contract that
attorneys' fees would only be awardable to Washington Federal and not Hulsey. As a result, the
issue of which party is or is not a prevailing party in this litigation is irrelevant.
Even if one does engage in a prevailing party analysis under the above rule, it is clear that
Washington Federal was the overall prevailing party in this judicial receivership and foreclosure
litigation. Washington Federal prevailed on the central issue in the litigation which was the
foreclosure against the real estate collateral. The rule in such a situation was announced by the
Idaho Supreme Court in Advanced Med Diagnostics, LLC v. Imaging Ctr. ofIdaho, 154 Idaho 812,
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71

Plaintiff contends
the district court was required to
fees between claims upon which Defendant prevailed and
it did not and
that it should only be able to recover attorney fees for litigating the claims upon
which it prevailed. It cites for that proposition Brooks v. Gigray Ranches, 128
Idaho 72,910 P.2d 744 (1996), and Willie v. Board of Trustees, 138 Idaho 131,
59 P.3d 302 (2002). In both of those cases, the prevailing party asserted a claim
for which it was statutorily entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees and a
claim for which there was no statute authorizing the award of attorney fees. In
that situation, we held that the prevailing party must apportion the fees between
the claim upon which it was entitled to recover attorney fees and the claim upon
which it was not. That analysis does not apply here because all of the claims
asserted in this litigation were to recover in a commercial transaction, for which
the prevailing party is entitled to an award of attorney fees. LC. § 12-120(3).
Where one party has been determined to be the overall prevailing party in the
litigation and by statute or contract the prevailing party is entitled to an award of
attorney fees on all claims asserted in the litigation, the award of reasonable
attorney fees is not required to be limited to the claims upon which the prevailing
party prevailed. Smith v. Mitton, 140 Idaho 893,901, 104 P.3d 367,375 (2004).
154 Idaho at 174
The history of this litigation shows that Hulsey used every means available to delay the
foreclosure in the vain hope that somehow the entire resort would sell, and he would be made whole
from the unfortunate investment in this real estate project. During the three years that Hulsey
delayed the foreclosure from the loan's maturity date in 2012, he did not prevail on any of the
material issues he raised in the litigation as shown by the following list of actions taken by him with
the goal of delaying the foreclosure:

1.

Promises Property Was Sold. The loan matured in 2012, and Hulsey kept
promising Washington Federal that he had the property sold and the bank
would be paid off.

2

Contested Foreclosure. Plaintiff Washington Federal filed its Complaint on
January 31, 2014. Instead of agreeing to the receivership and to the
foreclosure, Hulsey instead filed his answer asserting multiple affirmative
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Appointment Of
on
31
by Hulsey through the filing of responsive pleadings as
as
Of Jim Koon Re: Motion For Appointment Of Receiver. In addition, John F.
Magnuson filed his affidavit and other pleadings. It was only shortly before
the hearing on the receivership that Hulsey capitulated and agreed to the
appointment of a receiver.

5.

Hulsey Refused To Agree To Foreclosure. The Receiver was appointed by
the Court on March 17, 2014, but instead of immediately agreeing to a
foreclosure against the property, Hulsey continued to contest the foreclosure.
This resulted in Washington Federal having to request a trial setting on May
5, 2014. At any time during the litigation Hulsey could have easily agreed to
a foreclosure against the property, but he steadfastly refused to do so because
he wanted to preserve his ownership in case there was a sale.

6.

Contested Summary Judgment. As a result of Hulsey's steadfast refusal to
agree to a foreclosure, Washington Federal was compelled to file a motion
for summary Judgment on July 3, 2014, in order to proceed with foreclosure.
Rather than stipulate to the entry of the summary judgment at the time of the
filing of the motion, Hulsey opposed the Motion For Summary Judgment and
only stipulated to the entry of a summary judgment the day before the
summary judgment hearing. Again, Hulsey was simply engaging in
protracted litigation tactics in order to buy time to continue to try and sell the
property, all of which was in vain.

7.

Objected To Lease Renewals. Hulsey also vigorously contested the renewal
of the existing leases at the property. Hulsey had leases for the various units
being foreclosed upon by Plaintiff Washington Federal and these leases were
up for renewal. The Receiver in the exercise of his discretion had negotiated
renewal terms for the leases. Hulsey vigorously objected to the renewal of
these leases and filed not only an objection to the extension of the leases in
August of 2014, but also filed on September 2, 2014, a Motion for
Reconsideration of the denial of Hulsey's objection, which reconsideration
motion was also denied by the District Court.

8.

Frivolous Chapter i 1 Filed to Stop Foreclosure. After Hulsey had exhausted
every means available to him to delay the foreclosure, the Shoshone County
Sheriffs office scheduled the Sheriffs sale of the Hulsey property for
October 30, 2014. Instead of allowing the Sheriffs sale to proceed, Hulsey
filed a frivolous Chapter 11 Bankruptcy proceeding in the District of Idaho
which resulted in the automatic stay of the Bankruptcy Court being entered
preventing Washington Federal from foreclosing against his property.
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it to
objection to the Motion To Lift Stay which resulted
having
contested hearings before it Washington Federal prevailed on its Motion To
Lift Stay after the contested hearings.
10.

Effort To Remove Funds From Receiver. In the bankruptcy proceedings,
Hulsey attempted to obtain the funds from the Receiver who had been
previously appointed by this Court. Washington Federal therefore filed its
motion with the Bankruptcy Court to allow the Receiver to continue to hold
the rental income during the bankruptcy. Washington Federal prevailed on
their motion.

11.

Hulsey Lost His Motion For Approval Of Adequate Protection Payments In
Bankruptcy. During the bankruptcy Hulsey filed a Motion For Approval Of
Adequate Protection Payments in order to further stall the bankruptcy. After
a contested hearing, Hulsey lost the motion.

12.

Hulsey' s Appraisal Showed Deficiency. Hulsey' s MAI appraiser concluded
that the fair market value of the collateral real estate was $901,000.00 as of
the date of the final Sheriffs sale. The amount due and owing by Hulsey on
the date of sale was $1,529,080.76 as shown by Plaintiff Washington
Federal's Trial Exhibit Number 39. Thus, Hulsey's own expert testimony
showed that he was liable for a deficiency. As a result, at the last minute
Hulsey did not call Ed Morse to testify at trial. R. 1590, 1487

Accordingly, when one considers the overall course of the litigation with the primary issue
being whether Washington Federal was entitled to foreclose against the real property, Washington
Federal is clearly the prevailing party not only with regard to the primary issues of the litigation but
with regard to all of the subsidiary issues as well.

D.

The District Court Erred in Striking Portions of Washington Federal's Roy Cuzner
Affidavit Relating to Attorneys' Fees.
On January 11, 2016, Washington Federal filed the Affidavit of Roy Cuzner in Support of

Washington Federal's Objection and Motion to Disallow Attorneys' Fees and Costs. R. p. 1545.
This affidavit was submitted
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the settlement offer from

to

to

appraised value from Hulsey's MAI appraiser, Ed Morse, of $901,000.00. This evidence was
submitted to show that Washington Federal was justified in proceeding to trial and had actually
agreed to accept Hulsey's appraised value which would have still established a $628,000.00
deficiency on Hulsey's part.
The District Court also struck Exhibit D to Mr. Hulsey's affidavit because it contained the
September 16, 2015 narrative appraisal from Hulsey' s appraiser, Ed Morse, showing a value of
$901,000.00 for the property. This exhibit had been given to Washington Federal prior to trial as
one of the trial exhibits Hulsey was going to admit into evidence but he elected not to do so during
the trial.
Nevertheless, the foregoing facts were admissible to show the fact that Washington Federal
had made appropriate and legitimate settlement offers prior to trial and thus, supports the conclusion
that Washington Federal was the prevailing party in the litigation. Such evidence is admissible
under Zenner v. Holcomb, 147 Idaho 444, 450, 210 P.3d 552 (2009) ("the trial court was not
prohibited from considering Milton's offer of judgment in its prevailing party analysis for an award
of attorney's fees.").
The argument that the evidence contained in Roy Cuzner's affidavit was not admissible as
stated by the District Court is in error because of the foregoing Zenner decision but also because Mr.
Cuzner in his affidavit specifically recites the fact that he made the offer through Washington
Federal's counsel for which he had firsthand kn.owledge. In addition, the appraisal received from
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prepared

appraiser was a document that was received by Mr.

from the

documents
received. In any event, the appraisal from Hulsey's attorney was not submitted for the truth of the
matter stated but to show that Washington Federal was making appropriate settlement offers and was
justified in going to trial on the fair market value issue given the fact that even Mr. Hulsey's MAI
appraiser felt that there was a deficiency owed.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Washington Federal respectfully requests that the Court
reverse the District Court's ruling and remand the case back for a new trial.
DATED this _I_ day of September, 2016.
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE,

LLP

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day of September, 2016, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing was served upon the following by the method indicated below:
John F. Magnuson, Esq.
1250 Northwood Center Court, Suite A
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Counsel for Defendants/Respondents
Michael R. Hulsey and SM Commercial
Properties, LLC
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COMMERCIAL'
CENTURY 21 ® Beutler & Associates
1836 Northwest Boulevord
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

January 9, 2014
Michael Hulsey
Hulsey Development Company
PO Box8600
62200 Deertrail Road
Bend, OR 97701
Dear Mike:
Based on the attached Silver Mountain Lease Recap dated 1/9/2014, and our
conversation relating to Income and Expenses for the commercial condos you own at
Silver Mountain, Kellogg, Idaho, it is my opinion that the current value of your condos on
an Income Analysis is in the area of $550,000 to $575,000 or $57.00 per square foot for
the approximate 9,800 square feet of space you own,

Actual Annual Income: $125,856
Expenses:
Taxes 2013: ($15,331)
Insurance 2013: ($9,120}
CAM Expenses (30%): ($37J56)
Total Expenses: ($62,707)
Actual Net Income: $63,649
Cap Rate: 11 %
Current Market Value: $578,627
The Information above has been provided by the owner of the property. This analysis has not been
performed In accordance with Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal practice which requires valuers
to act as unbiased, disinterested third parties with Impartiality, objectivity and Independence and without
accommodation of personal Interest It is not to be construed as an appraisal and may not be used as such
for any purpose.

Sincerely,
Cent

eutler & Associates

.,;7
( Koon
Associate Broker
(208) 292-5700

Each oft!ce ts !ndapande11!!y owned and ope1oted

EXHIBIT

Sliver Mountain Lease

January 9, 2014

1·lobby 1,587 sq ft

$4,489 month

2-buslness office 119 sq ft
3-bike storage 246 a sq ft

$84 month
$297 month

4·ski retail $0.87 1,755 sq ft-this lease was readjusted by Sliver Mt Corp
under the threat of relocating

$2,003 month

5- office $500 month 588 sq ft

$500 month

6a&b-housekeeping units 312 sq ft @$0.71 a sq ft

$221 month

7a-Wlldcat Pizza 1,312 sq ft@ $1.32 a sq ft

$1,740 month

7b-Mountain Cafe 1,076 sq ft@ $1,50 a sq ft

$1,614 month

7c-Spa/Salon 1,312 sq ft

Vacant

TOTAL RENT

$10,448 Monthly

The problems are Unit 7b, Mountain Cafe struggles every month. All tenants other than Jeld Wen are
now on month to month. Even though the leases are (were) triple net with tenant paying HOA fees and
property taxes they cannot afford to pay, The Spa/Salon has been vacant for 4 months and they were
approximately 6 months behind In rent My choice is to force the tenants to pay all cost and loose them
as tenants or attempt to keep their units open and occupied.
Sliver Mountain has become a part time ski area and water park resort with poor customer service and a
poor repartition within the local community, Large groups boycott the resort and the condo owners are
In an uproar regarding management issues and high HOA fees.

